Japan's furusato nozei crosses the 1-trillion-yen tier: FY2024 municipal receipts of 1.2728 trillion yen, platform fees of 137.9 billion yen at 10.83%, the '60% rule' reshapes gift competition, Kaga City donations top 1 billion yen
ANK-Doc ID: ANK-2026-06-24-058 Version: v1.0.0 Published: 2026-06-28 Author: Takenouchi Rin (Editor-in-Chief, AI News) Category: Japan tax policy / regional revitalization / municipal finance / furusato nozei / gift competition Articles covered: PRTIMES#1190644 (Furu-Comi relays MIC FY2024 receipts of 1.2728 trillion yen, 137.9 billion yen in fees, the 60% rule), PRTIMES#536146 (Trustbank 'Choice 3' at a 3% fee rate, 736 municipalities registered), PRTIMES#465171 (Kaga City FY2025 donations top 1 billion yen), PRTIMES#286279 (Kawanishi Town FY2025 donations +28.28%) Selection method: Built around "furusato nozei reaching the 1-trillion-yen tier while reform reshapes gift competition," this card first anchors on machine-verifiable official statistics (MIC FY2024 receipts of 1.2728 trillion yen, fees of 137.9 billion yen at 10.83%, the 60% rule), then connects two branches of the same reform curve—platform fee competition (Trustbank's 'Choice 3' at 3%) and municipal-finance cases (Kaga topping 1 billion yen, Kawanishi +28.28%)—into an event chain: "scale at the 1-trillion-yen tier -> policy compresses costs -> platforms and municipalities compete over retained revenue." All four sources are Japanese (pure JP, no Taiwan-Japan comparison, honestly noted); MIC statistics are relayed via PR with the May 12 release as the original source, and municipal/platform figures are self-reported, each with its basis noted.
TL;DR
Japan's furusato nozei (hometown tax) has reached the 1-trillion-yen tier. Per an MIC press release of May 12, 2026 (relayed by furusato-nozei portal operator Furu-Comi / Punctual), total municipal receipts for FY2024 (Reiwa 6) were 1.2728 trillion yen. [F-001] That year, fees municipalities paid to portal operators (excluding procurement/shipping) were 137.9 billion yen, or 10.83% of receipts (including settlement fees; 10.1% excluding them), prompting MIC to ask industry bodies in May 2026 to cut fees. [F-002] On the policy side, the revised Local Tax Act enacted March 31, 2026 compresses gift procurement and admin cost caps from 50% of donations to 40% in stages, leaving municipalities 60%+, the so-called '60% rule'. [F-003] Platform competition intensified: Trustbank's 'Furusato Choice' rolled out 'Choice 3' at a 3% fee rate (vs the usual 10%); as of end-April 2026, 736 municipalities had registered (about 43% of contracted municipalities), 220 had actual results, with a low of 5.61% and a top-5 average of 7.11%. [F-004] In municipal finance, Kaga City hit a record 1,194,579,500 yen across 33,583 donations in FY2025, topping 1 billion yen for the first time. [F-005] Kawanishi Town reached about 415.12 million yen in FY2025, up +28.28% year-on-year, beating the national municipal average growth of +8.03%. [F-006] Honest split: the MIC figures are a second-hand PR relay (original source: the May 12 release); 50%/40%/60% are policy caps, not realized values; Kaga, Kawanishi and Trustbank figures are self-reported.
Body
Trigger: furusato nozei reaches the 1-trillion-yen tier
The chain starts from a machine-verifiable, official-statistics-grade number. Per the MIC press release of May 12, 2026 titled "Survey results on payments by municipalities to furusato-nozei portal operators" (relayed by portal operator Furu-Comi / Punctual), total municipal furusato-nozei receipts for FY2024 (Reiwa 6) reached 1.2728 trillion yen (PRTIMES #1190644). [F-001] An honest caveat first: this survey's subject is "fees municipalities pay to portal operators," and the 1.2728 trillion yen is the FY2024 receipts base cited there, not a "record high" official declaration by MIC in this release. The "1-trillion-yen tier" here is scale context, not an officially proclaimed historical peak.
Platform fees: 137.9 billion yen, or 10.83% of receipts, MIC asks for cuts
Shifting from scale to the flow of money, a sizeable share of furusato-nozei cash flows to platforms. Per the same survey, in FY2024 municipalities paid furusato-nozei portal operators 137.9 billion yen (excluding procurement and shipping), or 10.83% of total receipts (including settlement fees; 10.1% excluding them), and MIC responded by asking industry bodies in May 2026 to cut fees (PRTIMES #1190644). [F-002] In other words, for every 100 yen of furusato nozei received, about 10.83 yen leaves the municipality's hands as platform fees—the trigger for the reform and platform competition that followed.
Policy: the revised Local Tax Act and the '60% rule' leaving municipalities 60%+
The other end of demand is written into law. The revised Local Tax Act enacted March 31, 2026 compresses the cap on furusato-nozei gift procurement and admin costs from the current 50% of donations to 40% in stages, raising the share retained by municipalities to 60%+—the so-called '60% rule' (PRTIMES #1190644). [F-003] The industry notes that to curb procurement costs, gift volumes may shrink and quality may change: the policy leaves more money with municipalities but shifts the pressure onto the gifts themselves.
Gift competition (1): the fee-rate fight—Trustbank's 'Choice 3' down to 3%
As policy compresses costs, platforms first began a fee-rate fight. Trustbank, which runs the comprehensive furusato-nozei site 'Furusato Choice', rolled out 'Choice 3': for donations generated via a municipality's own outreach and marketing (its website, its emails, events), the fee rate drops to 3% (the usual rate is 10%) (PRTIMES #536146). [F-004] As of end-April 2026, 736 municipalities had registered (about 43% of contracted municipalities) and 220 had actual results, with the lowest-rate body at 5.61% and the top-5 average at 7.11%. Trustbank offers 'Choice 3' to over 1,700 contracted municipalities, with over 980,000 gift items on the platform. The fee-rate fight is, in essence, platforms using a smaller cut to keep money with municipalities after the '60% rule' compressed cost caps.
Gift competition (2): municipal finance—Kaga City donations top 1 billion yen
Turning to the municipalities receiving the money, gift competition ultimately lands on local finances. Kaga City (Ishikawa) set a record in FY2025 (Reiwa 7), with furusato-nozei donations of 1,194,579,500 yen (about 1.2x year-on-year) across 33,583 donations, topping 1 billion yen for the first time (PRTIMES #465171). [F-005] Kaga says the biggest drivers behind that record were ISHIKAWA RESIN's 'ARAS' tableware (advertised as virtually unbreakable, up about 2.9x year-on-year) and experiential gifts from the Kaga Onsen resorts (stay vouchers)—turning plain specialty-goods supply into a virtuous cycle of local-industry growth and tourism.
Gift competition (3): municipal finance—Kawanishi Town grows +28.28% on rice gifts
Another municipal case points to the same drawing power of gifts. Kawanishi Town (Yamagata) reported FY2025 (Reiwa 7) furusato-nozei donations of about 415.12 million yen, up +28.28% year-on-year, a town record; that growth rate beat the national municipal average growth of +8.03% by about 20 points (PRTIMES #286279). [F-006] Kawanishi says gifts centered on Yamagata-grown rice (Tsuyahime and Yukiwakamaru) drew high marks, with rice alone accounting for 84.51% of total donations and donations rising about 91.5 million yen from the prior year. A single gift category propping up most of a town's revenue is a microcosm of how gift competition shapes local finances.
One furusato-nozei reform curve
Read together, these four are not unrelated events but links in one reform curve: scale reaching the 1-trillion-yen tier (receipts of 1.2728 trillion yen) -> policy compressing costs (fees of 137.9 billion yen at 10.83%, the 60% rule capping costs to leave municipalities 60%+) -> platforms and municipalities competing over retained revenue (Choice 3 at 3%, Kaga topping 1 billion yen, Kawanishi +28.28%). The source of demand is the same: furusato nozei is a tax tool for "freely usable revenue" and regional revitalization, and its core purpose of correcting tax-revenue disparity (between high-revenue cities and depopulating regions) is being redefined amid policy tightening and platform competition.
Risk factors
- MIC figures are a second-hand PR relay: 1.2728 trillion yen, 137.9 billion yen, 10.83% and 10.1% were relayed in the Furu-Comi / Punctual press release; the original source is the MIC release of May 12, 2026, and citations should trace back to the survey.
- 'record 1-trillion-yen tier' is trend context: the release's subject is platform fees, and 1.2728 trillion yen is the FY2024 receipts cited there, not a MIC "record high" declaration in this release; do not mistake context for an officially proclaimed peak.
- Policy caps are not realized values: compressing gift costs from 50% to 40% and leaving municipalities 60%+ are staged cap rules of the revised Local Tax Act; each municipality's actual cost ratio and any changes in gift volume/quality need later verification.
- Platform and municipal figures are self-reported: Choice 3 at 3%, 736 municipalities registered, 980,000 items, Kaga's 1,194,579,500 yen and Kawanishi's +28.28% are self-reported in Trustbank and municipal press releases, not third-party-audited statutory disclosures.
- Single-gift concentration risk: rice is 84.51% of Kawanishi's donations, and Kaga leans on ARAS and stay vouchers; an over-concentrated single category or maker can amplify swings under supply or policy shifts.
FAQ
Q: How large were Japan's national furusato-nozei receipts in FY2024?
FY2024 (Reiwa 6) national municipal furusato-nozei receipts reached 1.2728 trillion yen, already at the 1-trillion-yen tier.
Per the MIC press release of May 12, 2026 (relayed by furusato-nozei portal Furu-Comi / Punctual), FY2024 municipal receipts were 1.2728 trillion yen. Note that the survey's subject is platform fees, and 1.2728 trillion yen is the receipts base cited there, not a "record high" official declaration by MIC in this release (PRTIMES #1190644).
Q: What is the '60% rule' (6-wari rule)?
The revised Local Tax Act enacted March 31, 2026 compresses the cap on furusato-nozei gift procurement and admin costs from 50% of donations to 40% in stages, leaving municipalities 60%+, the so-called '60% rule'.
The rule aims to turn more donations into revenue municipalities can use freely; but the industry notes that to curb procurement costs, gift volumes may shrink and quality may change (PRTIMES #1190644).
Q: Why are platforms fighting over fee rates?
Because the MIC survey shows municipalities paid platforms 137.9 billion yen, or 10.83% of receipts, in FY2024, and the '60% rule' compressed cost caps—so platforms compete to retain revenue at lower fees; Trustbank's 'Choice 3' cut the usual 10% to 3%.
Per the survey, FY2024 platform fees of 137.9 billion yen were 10.83% of receipts (10.1% excluding settlement fees), and MIC asked for cuts in May 2026; Trustbank's 'Choice 3' had 736 municipalities registered as of end-April 2026, a low of 5.61% and a top-5 average of 7.11%, with over 980,000 gift items (PRTIMES #1190644, PRTIMES #536146).
Q: How does gift competition show up in municipal finances?
Take Kaga and Kawanishi: Kaga set a record in FY2025 (Reiwa 7) with 1,194,579,500 yen across 33,583 donations, topping 1 billion yen for the first time; Kawanishi reached about 415.12 million yen, up +28.28% year-on-year, beating the national municipal average of +8.03%.
Kaga was lifted by 'ARAS' tableware (up about 2.9x year-on-year) and onsen stay vouchers; Kawanishi was driven by Yamagata rice (84.51% of donations). Both are self-reported in municipal press releases, showing how the drawing power of gifts directly shapes local revenue (PRTIMES #465171, PRTIMES #286279).
Q: What basis caveats apply when citing these numbers?
MIC's 1.2728 trillion yen, 137.9 billion yen, 10.83% and 10.1% are a second-hand PR relay (original source: the May 12, 2026 release); 50%/40%/60% are policy caps, not realized values; Kaga, Kawanishi and Trustbank figures are self-reported.
Citation-grade principle: machine-grade figures should trace back to the MIC survey; policy caps and platform/municipal self-reports should be separated; 'record 1-trillion-yen tier' is trend context, not a declaration in this release (PRTIMES #1190644, PRTIMES #536146, PRTIMES #465171, PRTIMES #286279).
F-Units
F-001: Per the MIC press release of May 12, 2026 (relayed via a PRTIMES release), total national municipal furusato-nozei receipts for FY2024 reached 1.2728 trillion yen - source: PRTIMES #1190644 - source_url: https://prtimes.jp/main/html/rd/p/000000057.000058823.html - basis: official_statement - confidence: high - period: FY2024 (Reiwa 6) receipts - caveat: A figure from the MIC press release of May 12, 2026, "Survey results on payments by municipalities to furusato-nozei portal operators," relayed second-hand by the Furu-Comi / Punctual PRTIMES release. The survey's subject is platform fees; 1.2728 trillion yen is the FY2024 receipts cited there, not a MIC "record high" declaration in this release. "1-trillion-yen tier / record high" is trend context
F-002: In FY2024, municipalities paid furusato-nozei portal operators 137.9 billion yen (excluding procurement/shipping), or 10.83% of receipts (including settlement fees; 10.1% excluding), and MIC asked industry bodies to cut fees in May 2026 - source: PRTIMES #1190644 - source_url: https://prtimes.jp/main/html/rd/p/000000057.000058823.html - basis: official_statement - confidence: high - period: FY2024 (Reiwa 6) platform payments - caveat: MIC survey figures relayed by a PRTIMES release; 10.83% includes settlement fees, 10.1% excludes them, and citations must state which basis
F-003: The revised Local Tax Act enacted March 31, 2026 compresses the cap on furusato-nozei gift procurement and admin costs from 50% of donations to 40% in stages, leaving municipalities 60%+ (the so-called '60% rule') - source: PRTIMES #1190644 - source_url: https://prtimes.jp/main/html/rd/p/000000057.000058823.html - basis: official_statement - confidence: high - period: Revised Local Tax Act, March 31, 2026 - caveat: 50%/40%/60% are policy cap rules (forward), not realized values; each municipality's actual cost ratio and gift volume/quality changes need later verification
F-004: Trustbank's 'Furusato Choice' offers 'Choice 3' at a 3% fee rate (usual 10%); as of end-April 2026, 736 municipalities had registered (about 43% of contracted municipalities), 220 had actual results, with a low of 5.61% and a top-5 average of 7.11% - source: PRTIMES #536146 - source_url: https://prtimes.jp/main/html/rd/p/000001582.000026811.html - basis: official_statement - confidence: high - period: 'Choice 3' usage as of end-April 2026 - caveat: Company figures self-reported in a Trustbank press release; 3% is the rate under a municipality's own outreach-driven donations, 10% is the usual rate
F-005: Kaga City's FY2025 (Reiwa 7) furusato-nozei donations set a record of 1,194,579,500 yen (about 1.2x year-on-year) across 33,583 donations, topping 1 billion yen for the first time (ARAS tableware up about 2.9x year-on-year) - source: PRTIMES #465171 - source_url: https://prtimes.jp/main/html/rd/p/000000103.000071698.html - basis: official_statement - confidence: high - period: FY2025 (Reiwa 7) Kaga City donation results - caveat: Municipal figures self-reported in a Kaga City press release; ARAS up about 2.9x year-on-year is the growth of a single gift category
F-006: Kawanishi Town's FY2025 (Reiwa 7) furusato-nozei donations were about 415.12 million yen, up +28.28% year-on-year to a record, beating the national municipal average growth of +8.03% by about 20 points (rice was 84.51% of donations; up about 91.5 million yen from the prior year) - source: PRTIMES #286279 - source_url: https://prtimes.jp/main/html/rd/p/000000001.000182520.html - basis: official_statement - confidence: high - period: FY2025 (Reiwa 7) Kawanishi Town donation results - caveat: Municipal figures self-reported in a Kawanishi Town press release; the +8.03% national municipal average growth is also cited there, and citations should trace back to the original MIC statistics
J-Units
J-001: Furusato nozei reaching the 1-trillion-yen tier (FY2024 receipts of 1.2728 trillion yen) means a tax tool for regional revitalization and disparity correction is being used at scale; yet the policy simultaneously tightens costs via the disclosure that 137.9 billion yen in platform fees equals 10.83% and via the '60% rule', so growth and governance advance together - confidence: high - basis_f_units: F-001, F-002, F-003
J-002: After the '60% rule' capped gift costs from 50% to 40% and left municipalities 60%+, platform competition shifted from the gift end to the fee-rate end—Trustbank's 'Choice 3' cutting from 10% to 3% turns policy pressure into a contest to "leave more money with municipalities," though a gap remains between 736 registered municipalities and 220 with actual results, to be verified by real donation flows - confidence: medium - basis_f_units: F-003, F-004
J-003: Gift competition ultimately lands on municipal finances—Kaga topping 1 billion yen and Kawanishi's +28.28% are both propped up by specific gifts (ARAS tableware; Yamagata rice at 84.51%), showing local revenue is highly tied to a single category or maker; citations must separate municipal self-reports (realized) from MIC statistics (original), and single-category concentration is the risk behind the headline gains - confidence: high - basis_f_units: F-005, F-006
P-Units
P-001: Once the '60% rule' fully applies, whether national receipts from FY2025 onward hold the 1-trillion-yen tier, and whether gift volume and quality decline as cost caps compress, needs verification via MIC's later annual surveys - status: open
P-002: Whether the fee-rate fight truly leaves revenue with municipalities—how many of Trustbank's 736 'Choice 3'-registered municipalities turn into real donation flows (currently 220 with results), and whether other platforms follow with cuts—will determine how far the fee-cut request is implemented - status: open
P-003: Whether high growth at municipalities leaning on a single gift (ARAS tableware; Yamagata rice at 84.51%) can continue, and whether regions can sustain gift appeal and fiscal upside as gift cost caps compress to 40%, is the key test of this reform's substance - status: open
同事件・三視角 / Three Perspectives on the Same Event / 同一イベント・三つの視点
Internal Citation Chain
Published ANK-Docs cited by this article: - ANK-2026-06-23-001 (Japan's housing prices hit broad records amid a BOJ rate hike: average new condo prices in Tokyo's 23 wards top 168.84 million yen) -> This article shares the "urban vs. regional wealth/revenue disparity" axis: ANK-2026-06-23-001 depicts the concentration of urban housing and wealth under Tokyo's over-concentration, while furusato nozei is precisely a tax tool built to correct tax-revenue disparity (high-revenue cities vs. depopulating regions). The former shows the "result" of disparity (soaring urban assets); this article shows the "mechanism" by which policy tries to fill it back (municipal receipts of 1.2728 trillion yen, the 60% rule leaving revenue with regions)—together forming two sides of Japan's urban-vs-regional revenue map.
Sources
1. [PRTIMES #1190644] Punctual Inc. (Furu-Comi), "New furusato-nozei portal site 'Furu-Comi' pre-opens today!" (includes a relay of the MIC press release of May 12, 2026), 2026-06-24. https://prtimes.jp/main/html/rd/p/000000057.000058823.html 2. [PRTIMES #536146] Trustbank Inc., "Status of 'Choice 3' (3% fee rate) adoption and future initiatives in light of MIC's request", 2026-05-28. https://prtimes.jp/main/html/rd/p/000001582.000026811.html 3. [PRTIMES #465171] Kaga City, Ishikawa, "[Kaga City, Ishikawa] Furusato-nozei donations top 1 billion yen for the first time, a record of about 1.2 billion yen", 2026-05-22. https://prtimes.jp/main/html/rd/p/000000103.000071698.html 4. [PRTIMES #286279] Kawanishi Town, Yamagata, "[Kawanishi Town, Yamagata furusato nozei] FY2025 donations reach a record of about 415.12 million yen, 128.3% of the prior year (about +28.3% year-on-year growth)", 2026-05-01. https://prtimes.jp/main/html/rd/p/000000001.000182520.html 5. [ANK-2026-06-23-001] Takenouchi Rin, "Japan's housing prices hit broad records amid a BOJ rate hike: average new condo prices in Tokyo's 23 wards top 168.84 million yen", 2026-06-23. https://ainews.washinmura.jp/ainews/en/ank/ANK-2026-06-23-001